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Introduction
A
mature Special Operations Forces (SOF) capa-
bility requires dedicated Air and Aviation 
resources, yet the Royal Canadian Air Force 
(RCAF) has not responded to the deepening 
operational relevance of Canadian SOF. In 
its capstone document, Air Force Vectors, the RCAF clusters 
SOF with Space and Cyber activities,1 both significantly 
more niche and less mature than Canadian Special Operations 
Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). Similarly, recent Airpower 
articles from the Canadian Military Journal and the Canadian 
Global Affairs Institute mention CANSOFCOM in passing 
only.2 With more than ten years of domestic and expedition-
ary SOF operations in support of Canada’s national interest, 
CANSOFCOM has emerged as a highly reliable organiza-
tion. More importantly, future indications show no end to the 
requirement for SOF. The Chief of Force Development charac-
terizes the Future Security Environment as one where “…state 
and non-state actors alike will seek to combine conventional, 
irregular and high-end asymmetric methods concurrently, often 
simultaneously in the land, sea, air, and space environments 
and the cyber domain to gain advantage in future conflict.”3 
With irregular and asymmetric threats, the irregular and 
asymmetric solutions provided by SOF are essential. As U.S. 
Admiral Eric Olsen stated, “…most conflicts involving NATO 
in the future will require broadly capable and skilled SOF.”4
Uniquely poised to respond to irregular and asymmetric 
threats, CANSOFCOM requires an increase in joint interoperability 
and capability development with the RCAF. This article analyzes 
broad trends in Air and Aviation as they relate to SOF Airpower. 
It clarifies the need for SOF Airpower, explores six technological 
trends: unmanned systems, autonomy, next-generation rotary wing, 
future precision strike, alternate-service delivery, and fuel require-
ments, and ultimately, presents implications for CANSOFCOM 
in order to advocate for future SOF Airpower.
Why SOF Airpower?
Ad hoc relationships between SOF and conventional Air and Aviation lack the foundational qualities necessary 
for fulfilling SOF mission sets. The Holloway Report, com-
missioned in 1980 after the failure of U.S. Operation Eagle 
Claw, concluded that “…the ad-hoc nature of the organiza-
tion and planning is related to most of the major issues,”5 
and recommended that a permanent organization be created 
to plan, train, and conduct counter-terrorism missions. This 
was the genesis for USSOCOM, and in particular, the 160th 
Special Operations Aviation Regiment.6 NATO SOF determined 
a similar force posture after realizing that, without dedicated 








































A CH-146 Griffon helicopter over Opa Locka, Florida, during Exercise Southern Breeze, 9 February 2017.

















Air and Aviation assets, their forces were unable to execute 
missions for which they were otherwise capable and ready.7 
 The NATO study provides several key reasons why any alter-
native is sub-optimal: Technical skills are different; common 
cultural understanding, values and norms are absent; and 
finally, planning and rehearsal parameters vary significantly.8
The rationale for dedicated SOF Air and Aviation does not 
presuppose an elaborate Air Wing. Light, agile, and interoper-
able airpower is more appropriate. CANSOFCOM has retained 
Operational Command of a squadron of 
CH-146 Griffon helicopters since 2006 (even 
earlier, in other configurations), employing this 
highly effective unit in support of domestic 
and expeditionary operations across the spec-
trum of CANSOFCOM missions and units.9 
Nevertheless, light utility helicopters have never 
been sufficient for the broad spectrum of SOF 
missions. CANSOFCOM needs additional 
capabilities from across the RCAF or beyond. 
As a CANSOFCOM member, the author can 
recount numerous examples of degraded mission results due to 
non-existent fixed-wing surveillance assets, lack of airborne preci-
sion fire support, poor integration with conventional aviation assets, 
or a combination of the above. To assure operational success into the 
future, CANSOFCOM must develop a mature Airpower capability.
Future Trends
Manned vs. Unmanned
The air domain now and into the future will mix manned and unmanned platforms, a trend which CANSOFCOM 
must embrace. The inclusion of unmanned assets, already 
currently common practice among well-developed militaries, 
is certain. Many missions flown in support of SOF, along with 
occasional conventional force missions, include long-endurance 
unmanned drones. The unmanned suite of aerial vehicles ranges 
from hand-held micro ‘off-
the-shelf’ varieties used by 
front-line tactical elements, 
to medium and high altitude 
long-endurance strategic 
unmanned assets. Canada is 
in the process of procuring 
medium altitude long endur-
ance systems. The CAF’s 
forays into unmanned sys-
tems came from humble 
beginnings in Afghanistan, 
relying upon sub-par short-
term leased versions. The 
long awaited permanent 
solution has a goal of pro-
curing “…interoperable, 
network-enabled Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems to provide 
Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance, Target 
Acquisition and all-weather 
precision strike capabili-
ties in support of CAF 
operations worldwide.”10 
Long-delayed but highly anticipated, unmanned systems will 
operationally enhance CANSOFCOM.
Autonomy
With certain use of unmanned systems, CANSOFCOM and 
the RCAF must determine how humans will remain relevant in 
the air domain, a trend known as Humans in the Loop. A report 
from the U.S. Air Force Air University concluded that there 
are no technological barriers to replacing manned fixed-wing 
assets with unmanned variants, thereby increasing the endur-
ance of platforms and preserving the lives 
of air crews in high-threat environments.11 
 Possibly, the preponderance of future air assets 
supporting the ‘find-fix-finish’ portions of the 
targeting cycle may be unmanned. Current 
unmanned assets fly with either a human pilot 
operating remotely, or with autonomous com-
puter algorithms replacing human control. 
When conducting surveillance missions, sur-
veilling a nation’s border or a coastline, for 
example, the latter might be preferred. Swarms 
of unmanned assets may provide persistent coverage and support 
over wide swaths of land or sea. However, for mission sets that 
depend on real-time intelligence, split-second adjustments, or 
those where lives hang in the balance, logic dictates that humans 
remain in the loop. The Air University report indicates that, even 
though technology is so well advanced that humans are the limit-
ing factor, in most cases, humans prove more discerning than a 
machine. For example, an autonomous asset cannot differentiate a 
wounded soldier from a healthy one, or a chaplain from a fighter.12 
Most commanders with authority over lethal engagements will 
likely never cede control of lethal force to a machine. While one 
may defer the notion of phasing out manned flight completely, 
unmanned assets are certain to become more and more prevalent 
in future war. Humans will remain in the loop across the spectrum 




















Lockheed Martin S-97 Raider.
“The rationale for 
dedicated SOF Air and 
Aviation does not 
presuppose an 
elaborate Air Wing.”
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Future Aviation
The next generation of aviation platforms must be considered 
for the CH-146 Griffon replacement, as technology advancements 
position aviation as the platform of choice for SOF missions. Future 
aviation platforms are trending in two different directions, both 
with longer combat ranges, faster speeds, and in higher and hotter 
conditions than today. First is the super-helicopter, exemplified 
by the Sikorsky S-97 Raider. With two coaxial counter-rotating 
main blades coupled with a rear thrust propeller, the S-97 and 
other variants achieve significantly increased speed without any 
drastic reduction in range, capacity, or auxiliary capabilities.13 
 Second is the tilt-rotor platform, most notably, the V-280 Valor. 
This category blends the vertical takeoff of a helicopter with the 
speed and range of a fixed-wing aircraft. The future of tilt-rotor 
technology looks bright, with the Bell V-280 Valor providing a 
fast, precise vertical takeoff mobility platform.14 The future of 
aviation technology may conceivably nullify the payload and 
range advantage that tactical fixed wing platforms currently 
enjoy over helicopters. As such, a future SOF planner is likely 
to choose a precision asset instead of one requiring fixed infra-
structure for take-off and landing. CANSOFCOM and the RCAF 
must collaborate on procurement of future helicopters with these 
considerations in mind.
Future Precision Strike
SOF operations will need precision fire support far into 
the future, a role that the RCAF must prioritize. Of the multiple 
offensive roles and missions of air forces, air-to-ground and close 
air support are the two most applicable to ground forces, and to 
SOF in particular. As an indication of this significance, the U.S. 
Air Force’s venerable A-10 Warthog has been taken out of impend-
ing retirement. According to open source reporting, “…much of 
the leadership within the Air Force is keen to retire the A-10 so 
that the resources used to maintain the fleet can be pumped into 
the fifth-generation F-35 program.”15 However, the high demand 
for the A-10 as the premier close air support platform (other than 
the AC-130 Spectre gunship), makes it a constant ‘go-to’ asset 
in support of ground forces.16 The trend of supporting the air-
land battle is one that will continue into the future, as attempts 
in recent history to achieve decisive victory without committing 
ground forces have failed. In the rare and unlikely event that a 
future conflict does not involve SOF in some capacity, it is certain 
to involve proxy forces, civilians in need of defending, or both. 
A second trend in precision strike is the case of the F-35 
and the A-29, as an illustration of the debate between expensive, 
complex strategic platforms and ones that are simple, abundant, 
and tactically focused. The future of strategic attack lies in the 
F-35 fifth generation stealth fighter, with the aircraft blending 
a futuristic high-technology airframe with a human pilot. With 
production delays, cost overruns and some sponsors withdrawing 
from the program, the F-35 has experienced some developmental 
problems.17 Nevertheless, the program continues, with a current 
cost per aircraft of approximately $100 million. Juxtaposed with 
the F-35 is the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft. 
The A-29, in comparison, costs a mere $10 million and can be 
employed in multiple roles, including precision strike and sur-
veillance and reconnaissance.18 However, its utility should not be 
overstated: The A-29 is not a stealth fighter or a fifth generation 
aircraft, and is inappropriate for ‘near-peer’ conflicts. However, 
it is certainly a viable option to permit ground forces, either our 
own or those of a partner nation, to run their own organic fixed 
wing fire support missions. For example, the Afghan Air Force 













Concept design of a Bell V-280 Valor.









































































































































A pair of Embraer A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft.
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The US Navy flirted with the concept of employing A-29s but 
cancelled the program, due to a number of factors beyond need 
and viability, principally Washington politics.20 The A-29 certainly 
cannot replace the platform requirement necessary to compete for 
air superiority or defend Canada’s north as part of our NORAD 
commitments. Nevertheless, the value of ‘down-teching’ applies 
to fixed wing strike platforms supporting SOF, and, arguably, in 
an equal sense across the spectrum of military technology.
Alternative Service Delivery
Contracted civilian aircraft via Alternate 
Service Delivery (ASD) would ease pressure 
on scarce RCAF resources while provid-
ing much-needed operational flexibility to 
CANSOFCOM well into the future. Alternate 
Service Delivery (ASD) means providing “…
services or products, which have been provided 
traditionally by the Public Service, through or 
in partnership with organizations outside the 
Public Service…while making the best use of 
scarce resources.”21 When applied to future 
SOF Airpower, ASD would see CANSOFCOM 
entering into public-private partnerships to leverage civilian 
airframes. There are many successful military examples of ASD. 
The RCAF Contracted Airborne Training Services (CATS) program 
uses civilian pilots and airframes to provide live-flying instruction 
as part of fighter pilot training.22 ASD can easily extend beyond the 
training realm. PAL Aerospace, headquartered in Canada, purports 
to have provided over 250,000 hours of airborne ISR in support 
of military and law enforcement missions.23 U.S. AFRICOM has 
also successfully used contracted Air and Aviation in operational 
theatres over the long term with success, and recently awarded 
new medium-term contracts to two separate air mobility provid-
ers.24 In times of relative fiscal constraint, the lease vs. buy option 
provided by ASD makes sense for the RCAF and CANSOFCOM. 
ASD also opens up flexibility for CANSOFCOM that the RCAF 
cannot provide. In 2014, the Globe and Mail reported that down-
grades to the CC-144 Challenger fleet would mean the “…air force 
may have to use larger, more costly aircraft for 
important military missions, including medical 
evacuation.”25 Outsourcing access to platforms, 
perhaps even with outsourced crews, helps to 
solve future resource scarcity.
The ASD concept may also be applied 
to re-role current RCAF platforms in order to 
provide SOF-specific mission capabilities. This 
is a novel solution with significant potential 
for CANSOFCOM. The U.S. Marine Corps 
achieved something similar with their UH-1 
Huey platforms, in which they upgraded a 
portion of their fleet into more powerful light-
attack helicopters while maintaining 85 percent commonality of 
parts.26 This same style of program could be applied to the Griffon 
Limited-Life Extension program for CANSOFCOM airframes.27 
 This upgrade would preserve a common airframe, while meeting 
future SOF requirements for mobility and fire support. Further, more 
short-term variations of this concept include light-weight, rapidly 
reconfigurable weapon and sensor mounts for the Griffon helicopter.28 
















































A USAF Bell TH-1H Huey II.
“The US Navy flirted 
with the concept of 
employing A-29s but 
cancelled the program, 
due to a number of 
factors beyond need 
and viability, principally 
Washington politics.”

















re-role from mobility platforms to fire support. This roll-on, 
roll-off concept may be applied across the spectrum of RCAF 
platforms, allowing greater flexibility and operational relevance 
for CANSOFCOM through alternate means of delivery. 
Fuel Sources
The cost and environmental impact of carbon fuel sources will 
push militaries to develop alternative fuel sources, a consideration 
that the RCAF and CANSOFCOM must embrace. The U.S. Navy 
began this process with The Great Green Fleet, a program designed 
to help their ships and aircraft “…go farther, stay longer and deliver 
more firepower” through, among other things, advanced biofuel.29 
Although future RCAF airframes will one day be powered by per-
petual fuel sources, such as nuclear and solar power, the foreseeable 
future will maintain the requirement for aircraft and helicopters to 
refuel regularly. Refueling has two viable tactical options: either 
from the air or on the ground. Air-to-air refueling has long been a 
standard practice for fixed wing platforms. It is beginning to tran-
sition into the conventional aviation realm, although the RCAF’s 
newest helicopter is not equipped with this capability.30 Ground 
refueling via a forward arming and refueling point remains the most 
likely tactical option for aviation, and it may be the preferred option 
for both Air and Aviation mission profiles not suitable for vulner-
able tanker aircraft. In recognition of the continued need to refuel, 
CANSOFCOM has developed the Airfield Surface Assessment and 
Reconnaissance capability to facilitate tactical airfield operations 
on unprepared, unconventional, and semi-prepared airfields.31 This 
capability allows CANSOFCOM to facilitate wet-wing refueling 
from CC-130s to helicopters, along with various other concepts to 
extend the range of tactical mobility platforms.32 Notwithstanding 
likely fuel sources yet to be operationalized, the need to refuel will 
exist well into the future, and capabilities such as this increase the 
reach that the RCAF and CANSOFCOM can achieve together.
Implications for CANSOFCOM
This article has analyzed a number of future trends applicable for Canadian Air and Aviation. The increase in 
unmanned assets, artificial intelligence, future fixed and rotary 
wing platforms, alternate service delivery, as well as changes 
to future fuel sources will affect the CAF well into the future. 
A few conclusions specific to CANSOFCOM appear clear. 
First, the SOF ‘truth’ that humans are more important than hard-
ware remains highly relevant.33 All the technological advances 
aside, the decision-action cycle requires human authority. This 
is certainly the case in the near term, while there is very low – or 
no – trust associated between autonomous and manned aircraft. 
More broadly speaking, however, human decision-makers must 
remain involved in order to provide accountability to the public they 
serve. Concurrently, the SOF ‘truth’ that most special operations 
require non-SOF assistance is equally relevant. CANSOFCOM 
is unlikely to grow Air and Aviation assets across the entire spec-
trum of tasks and capabilities. With a medium-size military, and a 
budget below NATO guidelines,34 CANSOFCOM cannot expect 
to replicate American SOF assets. As such, Canada must continue 
and augment the dedication of RCAF elements in support of SOF 
missions. These relationships must not fall prey to the ‘ad hocism’ 
of other nations’ past mistakes but rather be lasting and meaning-
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Bearing these SOF truths in mind, consideration of pragmatic 
and incremental growth in SOF Air and Aviation should occur. 
Unquestionably, precision aviation will continue to be a core SOF 
task. A replacement for the CH-146 Griffon should be retroac-
tively added to the Defence Policy Review, with SOF-specific 
considerations onboard.35 In the interim, CANSOFCOM and 
the RCAF must collaborate to meet current needs as part of the 
Griffon Limited Life Extension. Interoperability with the RCAF 
medium-lift aviation capability should be pursued. This relation-
ship must support CANSOFCOM adequately to allow for episodic 
and sustained joint training, while determining the best practices 
for integration of light-and-medium platforms under a Special 
Operations Aviation Detachment. For mobility needs beyond what 
aviation can provide, interoperability with the C-130 community 
must continue and be expanded. ASD options for non-standard 
fixed wing mobility and fire support should be explored. As an 
example, procuring a roll-on, roll-off ISR and fire support con-
figuration for the C-130 or the recently-procured C-295 may be 
viable. Regardless of the platform, CANSOFCOM must continue 
to support tactical refueling of RCAF assets to extend operational 
reach beyond current capabilities. Lastly, CANSOFCOM must 
own a portion of the ISR continuum. Affiliation may work for 
other RCAF assets but will not for high-payoff, low-density intel-
ligence collectors. NATO SOF learned this lesson: “Reliance on 
non-dedicated air support … is equally disadvantageous due to 
scarcity of resources, lack of a habitual training relationship, and 
unfamiliarity with the SOF mission.”36
Conclusions
Summary 
1) Despite autonomy and AI, humans must remain in the 
decision-action cycle, albeit further back in the loop with 
the progress of time
2) RCAF elements must be dedicated to support SOF missions 
across the range of capabilities
3) SOF Airpower must grow pragmatically and incrementally:
a. Griffon life extension and replacement program with 
SOF equities
b. Force Employment Concept for a combined Griffon-
Chinook SOAD
c. Consider ASD for non-standard fixed-wing mobility 
and fire support
d. Operationalize the CANSOFCOM ASAR Capability
4) Generate CANSOFCOM-owned ISR, manned and unmanned
This article has sought to determine which future SOF Air and Aviation assets should support CANSOFCOM’s 
mandate. Although the themes analyzed here do not provide 
an unobstructed roadmap into the future, they serve as a 
starting point for further discussion. Areas for further study 
include the effects of mega-cities, the struggle to exploit 
vastly increasing amounts of ISR data, and the organiza-
tional design for an expanded RCAF component within 
CANSOFCOM. Notwithstanding the complexity of future 
trends, CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must be closely linked 



















































An AC-130U Spectre gunship in action.

















1. Director General Air Force 
Development, A-GA-007-000/
AF-008, Air Force Vectors 
(Winnipeg: Canadian Forces 
Aerospace Warfare Centre, 
2014), p. 20. 
2. Alan Stephenson, “The RCAF 
and the Role of Airpower: 
Considering Canada’s 
Future Contributions,” in 
Canadian Global Affairs 






pdf?1467750319, and Martin 
Shadwick, “A Renaissance 
for the RCAF?”, in Canadian 
Military Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, 
(Spring 2017), pp. 60-66. 
3. Chief of Force Development, 
The Future Security 
Environment 2013-2040 
(Winnipeg: 17 Wing Winnipeg 
Publishing Office, 2014), p. 93.
4. Canadian NATO Parliamentary 
Association, “Report of the Canadian 
Parliamentary Delegation Respecting its partici-
pation at the Visit of the Defence and Security 
Committee,” 29 January 2010, accessed 




5. Michael J. Durant, Steven Hartov, and Robert L. 
Johnson, The Night Stalkers: Top Secret Missions 
of the US Army’s Special Operations Aviation 
Regiment (New York: Penguin, 2006), p. 13.
6. Ibid.
7. NATO Special Operations Headquarters, Special 
Operations Air Group: Concept for Development 
& Organization (Brussels: NATO Public Policy 
Division, 33 April 2010), p. 1.
8. Lieutenant Colonel Arthus D. Davis, (ed.), The 
NATO Special Operations Headquarters Air 
Warfare Center: A Smart Defense Approach 
(Monterey: Presidio Press, 2012), p. 15.
9. Limited open source reporting exists on 






10. Danny Garrett-Rempel, “Will JUSTAS Prevail? 
Procuring a UAS Capability for Canada,” in 
RCAF Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2015), 




11. Robert B. Trsek, The Last Manned Fighter 
(Alabama: Air University Press, 2008), p. v.
12. Ibid, p. 24.
13. Jon Skillings, “How the helicopters of the future 
are shaping up,” CNET, 6 October 2013, accessed 
14 November 2016 at: https://www.cnet.com/
news/how-the-helicopters-of-the-future-are-shap-
ing-up/.
14. Gareth Jennings, “Bell’s Valor tiltrotor comes 
together ahead of 2017 first flight,” in Jane’s, 
20 January 2016, accessed 14 November 2016 at: 
http://www.janes.com/article/57314/bell-s-valor-
tiltrotor-comes-together-ahead-of-2017-first-flight.
15. Jay Bennett, “U.S. Air Force Fires Up the 
A-10 Depot Line to Keep Warthogs Flying 
‘Indefinitely’,” in Popular Mechanics, 25 October 





17. Clyde Haberman, “Despite Decades of Stealth, 
Sticking Points Bedevil F-35 Jet,” in New York 




18. Franz J Marty, “First four A-29 Super Tucanos 
arrive in Afghanistan,” Jane’s, 18 January 




20.  “Imminent Fury: Combat Dragon II,” in Global 
Security, accessed 14 November 2016, at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ 
aircraft/imminent-fury.htm.
21.  Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 




22.  CAE, NATO Flying Training in Canada (NFTC), 





23.  PAL Aerospace, accessed 15 May 2017, at: 
https://www.palaerospace.com/#airbornespecial
missionoperations2.
24. Jane’s 360, “AAR Airlift Group, Inc. awarded 
AFRICOM airlift contract,” accessed 15 
May 2017, at: http://www.janes.com/article/ 
67688/aar-airlift-group-inc-awarded-africom- 
airlift-contract.
25. Murray Brewster, “Cuts to Challenger jets leave 
air force juggling VIP, military medevac roles,” 




26. Lieutenant General Jon M. Davis, Marine 




27. Canadian American Strategic Review, “Griffon 
Grows Up: ‘Hot-and-High’ helicopters for 




28. For an example, see http://cfdintl.com or http://
cantinearmament.com/.
29. U.S. Navy, “Great Green Fleet”, U.S. Navy 
Energy, Environment and Climate Change, 2016, 
at: http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/energy/great-
green-fleet/.
30. Royal Canadian Air Force, “CH-147F Chinook 
Technical Specifications,” accessed 16 May 2017, 
at: http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/aircraft-
current/ch-147f.page.
31. CANSOFCOM, “Special Forces Airfield Surface 
Assessment & Reconnaissance Program,” 
Briefing to War Cabinet, 12 June 2017. 
32. Lieutenant-Colonel Jeannot Boucher, “Tactical-
Aviation Mobility,” in The Royal Canadian Air 
Force Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Fall 2015), pp. 
24-30.
33. Generally attributed to John Collins, a retired 
U.S. Army colonel.
34. NATO, “Information on Defence Expenditures,” 
27 July 2016, accessed 15 November 2016, at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.
htm.
35. Department of National Defense, Strong Secure 
Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy, 2017, p. 39.
36. NATO, Special Operations Air Group, p. 1.
NOTES
A CH-146 Griffon helicopter in Wainwright, Alberta, during Exercise Maple Resolve 16, 29 May 2016.
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